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NOTES
SUCCESSIONS-COMMUNITY PROPERTY-RENUNCIATION - Joseph
Paline died intestate leaving a widow, two sons and five grand-
children. Since his succession, consisting solely of community prop-
erty, was renounced by his sons, their mother was placed in pos-
session. Upon her death, she bequeathed to her sons the real property
formerly belonging to the community. After partition of the prop-
erty, one of the sons contracted with the defendant who agreed to
purchase a portion of this land. In answer to a suit for specific per-
formance, the defendant denied that plaintiff's title was merchant-
able. One of the grandchildren intervened contending that, by vir-
tue of the renunciation, title to their grandfather's share of the com-
munity vested in the five grandchildren. Held, by the 1938 amend-
ment to Article 915 "the wife was virtually-for succession purposes
as set forth in article 888-placed in the same category as a blood
relation to the deceased"' and "became recipient of the accretion as
she is the heir ,in the next rank or degree under the provisions of
Article 915, R.C.C."' Paline v. Heroman, 211 La. 64, 29 So. (2d) 473
(1946), Justices Hawthorne and Fournet dissenting.
Prior to 1938 the surviving spouse inherited both separate and
community property as an irregular heir. Act 408 of 1938, which
amended Article 915 of the Civil Code, provides that the surviving
spouse shall "inherit as a legal heir by operation of law, and without
the necessity of compliance with the forms of law provided in this
chapter for the placing of irregular heirs in possession of the suc-
cessions to which they are called." Clearly, the act intended only to
make the surviving spouse inheriting under Article 915 a regular
heir with seizen, thus eliminating the procedure required for being
put into possession as an irregular heir.' It was not the 1938 amend-
ment which changed the rights of the surviving spouse in the order
of inheritance of community property,4 but the amendments of 1910
1. 211 La. 64, 29 So. (2d) 478, 474 (1946).
2. 211 La. 64, 29 So. (2d) 478, 476.
3. Daggett, Matters Pertaining to the Civil Code (1942) 5 LousiANA LAw
REvrzw 83; Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1988 (198) 1
LOUISIANA LAw REvxEw 83; Oppenheim, The Inheritance of the Surviving Spouse
-Article 915, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 (1946) 21 Tulane L. Rev. 54,.
4. The intent of the legislature on this point is further evidenced by the
statements of Senator W. D. Cotton, the proponent of Act 82 of 1942, which
reenacted and amended the 1988 act. "It was the very definite purpose of this
Act to remove any possible doubt created by the jurisprudence, and to definitely
establish the surviving spouse a regular heir in all cases when community prop-
erty was from the deceased spouse.
. . . The Legislative intent was . . . to make said surviving spouse a
regular heir in all cases, and particularly to obviate the necessity of the pro-
ceedings of an irregular succession." (Letter from Captain W. D. Cotton, dated
New Orleans, October 7, 1942.)
5. La. Act 57 of 1910: "In all cases when either the husband or wife shall
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and 1916.0 None of these amendments, however, purport to classify
the surviving spouse as a degree relation to the deceased spouse.
Article 915, which governs the inheritance of community prop-
erty, provides that "In the event the deceased leave descendants' his
or her share shall be inherited by such descendants in the manner
provided by law." The absence of descendants, therefore, is a condi-
tion precedent to the right of the surviving spouse or parents of the
decedent to inherit any part of his or her share of the community.
According to strict lexiographical meaning, the term "descend-
ants" means only the issue of a deceased person and not the children
of a living person.' This definition would not apply in this case
since Article 14' states that "The words of the law are generally
to be understood in their most usual signification, without attending
so much to the niceties of grammar as to the general and popular
use of the words." The term "descendants" is generally accepted
as including the lineal issue of a living person." This view seems
to be supported by Article 3556(8)" which defines children as "not
only the children of the first degree, but the grandchildren, great-
grandchildren, and all other descendants in the direct line." The
French commentators also consider the children of the renouncing
child as descendants.'"
The court in the case under consideration relied in part upon
Jacob v. Falgoust,3 where the children of the marriage renounced
die leaving no descendants, nor ascendants and without having disposed by last
will and testament of his or her share in the community property, such undis-
posed of share shall be Inherited by the survivor in full ownership."
6. La. Act 80 of 1916: "In all cases, when either husband or wife shall die,
leaving no ascendants or descendants, and without having disposed by last will
and testament, of his or her share of the community property, such undisposed
of share shall be inherited by the survivor in full ownership. But in the event
the deceased should leave descendants his or her estate shall be inherited by them
in the manner now provided for by law. But should the deceased leave no
descendants, but a father or mother, or both, the estate shall be divided into two
equal portions, one of which will go to the father and mother, or the survivor of
them, and the other portion to the surviving spouse."
7. Italics supplied.
8. In re Plaster's Estate, 179 Misc. 80, 87 N. Y. S. (2d) 498, 501 (1942);
Lamb v. State Tax Com'r, 72 N. D. 42, 44, 4 N. W. (2d) 585, 586 (1942); Par-
rish v. Mills, 101 Tex. 276, 283, 106 S. W. 882, 886 (1908).
9. La. Civil Code of 1870.
10. Lamb v. State Tax Com'r, 72 N. D. 42, 45, 4 N. W. (2d) 585, 586 (1942);
Bouvier, Law Dictionary (Student ed. 1934); Cyclopedia Law Dictionary (8 ed.
1940).
11. La. Civil Code of 1870.
12. 4 Planiol et Ripert, Traite Pratique de Droit Civil Francais (1928) 101,
no 72; 2 Toullier, Le Droit Civil Francais (6 ed. 1846-1848) tit. 1, Successions 119,
§ 8, no 202.
18. 160 La. 21, 90 So. 426 (1922): "It may be added that it does not follow,
because the heirs renounced the community, that they renounced their mother's
succession. As a matter of fact, they accepted that, which included a large claim
[Vol. Vill
NOTES
their mother's interest in the community. Nieces and nephews of
the deceased spouse claimed her share as the heirs next in degree.
Although the Civil Code has no provision for the disposition of the
wife's interest in community property which she or her heirs re-
nounce, the court held that such interest remains in the husband
by force of his original title."4 This case is not controlling because
the heirs of the wife renounced her interest in the community; 5
whereas in the Paline case the heirs renounced the succession of their
father. 6 No authority would have permitted them to renounce
their father's share of the community.17 The Jacob case also differs
from the case under consideration in that there were no descendants
other than the children who renounced.
Under Article 1022"8 "The portion of the heir renouncing the
succession goes to his coheirs in the same degree; if he'has no co-
heirs of the same degree, it goes to those in the next degree." In
the present case, since all the coheirs in the same degree renounced
the succession, it devolved upon those in the next degree. The court
decided that upon the renunciation by all the children of the de-
ceased spouse, the surviving widow (in the absence of parents)
inherited as the heir in the next degree in preference to her grand-
children. This conclusion appears to be erroneous.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code the wife has never been
considered as a degree relation to her husband."9 Although Article
915 grants to the surviving spouse an equal right to inherit with
ascendants in the first degree, this position in the order of inheritance
is not pertinent to the decision in the present case. To determine
who are the heirs of the de cujus next in rank or degree entitled to
inherit the succession, it is necessary to consult Articles 902-915.2 In
the inheritance of both separate and community property the entire
fabric of the Civil Code indicates that lawful descendants are called
against the community, which doubtless they desired to enforce." 150 La. 21, 24,
90 So. 426, 427.
14. Fabre v. Hepp, 7 La. Ann. 5 (1852); Jacobs v. Falgoust, 150 La. 21, 90
So. 426 (1922).
15. In accordance with a special privilege granted to the wife and her heirs
by Arts. 2410, 2411 and 2428, La. Civil Code of 1870.
16. Governed by Arts. 1014-1081, La. Civil Code of 1870.
17. Succession of Baum, 11 Rob. 814 (La. 1845). Daggett, The Community
Property System of Louisiana (reprinted with addenda, 1945) 77.
18. La. Civil Code of 1870. If the 'sons had renounced in favor of their
mother, under Articles 1002 and 1003 of'the Civil Code of 1870, the renunciation
would have been considered as an acceptance with a gift over. However, the
renunciation was not made in favor of any person, and, therefore, must be gov-
erned by the general provisions of the Civil Code dealing with renunciation of
successions.
19. Arts. 888, 892, 924, 1495, La. Civil Code of 1870.
20. Ibid.
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to the succession to the exclusion of all other classes, independent
of the nearness in degree.2  Thus descendants exclude all other
relatives, ascendant or collateral, who are even more closely related
to the deceased.22
Since the renouncing heir is still alive, his children cannot repre-
sent him," but under Article 90224 descendants may inherit either
by representation or in their own right. The renunciation by the
forced heirs did not affect the rights of the grandchildren to inherit
de son chef.25 Therefore, since there were descendants who had not
renounced the succession, this class of heirs is the only one to be
considered in determining who are the "heirs in the next degree."
Applying the above rules to the present case, the grandchildren, as
the nearest in degree in the descending line, should have inherited
in preference to the wife.
LAWRENCE B. SANDOZ
21. Arts. 888, 902, 916, 1498-1494, La. Civil Code of 1870. Saunders, Lectures
on the Civil Code (1925) 190: "Now with regard to the persons whom the law
designates to be the legal heirs of a person when he dies intestate, without a will.
In the first place, his descendants are his heirs; and no matter how remote they
inherit to the exclusion of everyone else."
Cross, Successions (1891) 70, § 50: "The order among legal heirs is as
follows: 1. Children and their descendants to the exclusion of all persons."
22. 2 Toullier, loc. cit. supra note 12: ". . . the law calls to the first order,
to the exclusion of all other ascendant or collateral relatives, the descendants of
a deceased person."
"No 202. This calling of descendants of the deceased, to the exclusion of
other order or lines, is independent of the proximity of degree. They exclude all
other ascendants or collateral relatives of an equal degree, or even more closely
related to the deceased. For example:
Jules
I II
I I
I I
Raymond Auguste "de cujus"
U
John (renouncing or declared unworthy)
Marc
"Marc, not being able to represent John, his father, renouncing or declared
unworthy, remains the relation of Auguste, his grandfather, in the second degree.
However, he excludes from the succession both Jules, father of Auguste, who is
in the first degree, and Raymond, brother, who is in the second degree, because
the relations in the ascendent line, and those in the collateral line, even brothers,
are called to inherit only in the single case where the decedent leaves no pos-
terity."
2. Art. 899, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Persons deceased only can be repre-
sented; persons alive cannot." 2 Toullier, loc. cit. supra note 12.
24. La. Civil Code of 1870.
25. 2 Toullier, loc. cit. supra note 12.
